In spite of efforts by the Pentagon to aggressively recruit youth into the Army, the Army missed its benchmarks once again in 2007. NPP releases its analysis of 2007 recruiting and provides access to data by state, county and ZIP Code.
The Iraq War began to have an impact on recruiting in 2005, when the Army missed its goal for the number of recruits. In 2007, for the third year in a row, the Army did not meet its benchmark for the level of educational attainment of recruits. The percentage of recruits the Department of Defense (DoD) considers ‘high quality’ also dropped considerably. A higher percentage of recruits will drop out well before the end of the first term of enlistment, leading to further increases in spending on recruitment and training, including enlistment bonuses and pay for additional recruiters.
This analysis is based on data obtained from the Department of Defense (Army Recruiting Command) through a Freedom of Information Act request submitted by the National Priorities Project. The Department of Defense provided the data for every non-prior service, active-duty Army recruit by ZIP Code with race, ethnicity, gender, birth date, citizenship, educational attainment and score on the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) for fiscal year 2007. Demographic data used in the study were purchased from Claritas, a leading marketing and demographic data company. Population Estimates from the Census Bureau were also used.
To access the data by ZIP Code, county, or state, go to the NPP Database.
This analysis of Army recruiting in fiscal year 2007 is the National Priorities Project’s fourth study on military recruiting. The data and statistics for 2007 are compared to earlier studies done by NPP where relevant.
Decrease in ‘educational attainment’ and ‘high quality’ recruits continues
Educational attainment
For the third consecutive year, the Army missed DoD benchmarks set for educational attainment and scores on the Armed Forces Qualification Test. The DoD has a goal that 90 percent of new recruits have a regular high school diploma or better. According to, what the DoD says is “more than 40 years of studies”, around 80 percent of those with regular high school diplomas will finish the first term of enlistment. Up to half of those with a GED, other alternative equivalency credential, or no credential will drop out during the first term of enlistment. Having a regular high school diploma is the single best predictor of successful completion of a first term of enlistment.1
High proportions of recruits dropping out during the first term of enlistment has serious consequences. In order to maintain end-strength, more recruits will be needed in future years. More personnel and money will need to be devoted to recruiting. Money, time and other resources spent on training recruits who drop out is lost.
The DoD classifies military recruits according to educational attainment in ‘tiers.’ Tier 1 recruits are those with at least a regular high school diploma. The proportion of active-duty Army recruits in tier 1 has dropped from 83.5 percent in 2005 to 70.7 percent in 2007. While the benchmark of 90 percent was also missed in 2005, the percentages have not been this low for at least 20 years. In 2006, the result was 73.1 percent.
Nevada with 54.1 percent, Montana with 58.2 percent, and Mississippi with 59.2 percent had the lowest percentages of recruits that were tier 1. Nevada, Oregon and Alaska had the lowest percentages in 2006. The vast majority of states, 42, showed declines in the proportion of tier 1 recruits. Only eight states plus the District of Columbia showed modest increases. Vermont, Nebraska and Minnesota had the highest percentages of tier 1 recruits, though they still were well below 90 percent with 80.8, 80.6, and 79.8 percent respectively. See Table 1.
The South and West had the lowest percentages of tier 1 recruits. The Midwest had the highest percentage. See Table 2.
Armed Forces Qualification Test
All recruits also take the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) which is normalized for the youth population. The test score indicates trainability. Those in Categories I and II tend to be above average in trainability; those in Category IIIA and IIIB are average; those in IV are below average; those in Category V are markedly below average.2
Until 2006, the DoD had a goal of at least 67 percent of recruits testing at least in the 50th percentile of the AFQT, in terms of the categories, I – IIIA. Since 2005, the percentage of active-duty Army recruits scoring in the top half of the AFQT has fallen. In 2007, it was 60.8 percent. The DoD attempted to cap Category IV recruits to less than 2 percent, but recently raised the cap to 4 percent. Historically, this has not been a problem, but since 2005, the percentage of Category IV recruits has been at least 4 percent. In 2007, it was 4.1 percent.
‘High quality’
The Department of Defense defines a ‘high quality’ recruit based on a combination of educational attainment and AFQT score. A ‘high quality’ recruit is one who scores at or above the 50th percentile on the AFQT, and who is tier I (has a regular high school diploma or better). The DoD strives to have all recruits be ‘high quality’ as these recruits will be more likely to complete contracted enlistment terms and perform better in training and on the job. The percentage of ‘high quality’ recruits has dropped precipitously. In 2005, it was 56.2 percent, in 2006, it was 46.6 percent and in 2007, the number dropped further to 44.6 percent. Compared to 2004, the Army is recruiting more than one-fourth fewer ‘high quality’ youth.
States with the lowest percentages of ‘high quality’ recruits were Mississippi with 31.6 percent, Louisiana with 33.3 percent, and Nevada with 33.6 percent. Mississippi, Alabama, and Arkansas had the lowest percentages in 2006. While 17 states showed improvements in the proportion of ‘high quality’ recruits, 33 showed declines with one state remaining the same. Minnesota, New Hampshire and South Dakota had the highest percentages of ‘high quality’ recruits. See Table 3.
The South had the lowest percentage of ‘high quality’ recruits, followed by the West. The Midwest had the highest percentage of ‘high quality’ recruits. See Table 2.
States with higher recruitment rates – the number of recruits per 1,000 youth – correlated with lower percentages of ‘high quality’ recruits and lower percentages of tier 1 recruits.3 In other words, in high recruiting states, the Army may be recruiting more youth into the service, but at a greater long-term cost.
Wealthier neighborhoods remain under-represented
In 2007, upper-middle and high-income neighborhoods – those with median household incomes of $60,000 and greater – remained under-represented. The representation of these neighborhoods declined compared to 2004. Low- and middle-income neighborhoods – those with median household incomes of between $30,000 and $54,999 – became more over-represented compared to 2004. As the Iraq War continues for almost five years, the burden continues to be borne by low- and middle-income neighborhoods. See Graph.
‘Very poor’ ZIP Codes appear to be under-represented but this result should be treated with caution. Preliminary research indicates a large number of these ZIP Codes are university dormitories. Thus, they have unusually high 18-24 year-old populations, few recruits and very low median household incomes.
Counties and States with high numbers of recruits and high recruitment rates
Harris County, Texas with 1,025 recruits; Maricopa County, Arizona with 923 recruits; and Los Angeles County, California with 917 recruits topped the list for counties with the highest absolute number of recruits. See Table 4. These areas have large youth populations, so more indicative of recruiting is the number per 1,000 youth population. Edwards County, Texas; Dixie County, Florida; Galax city, Virginia; and Turner County, Georgia had the highest recruitment rates, all over 10 per 1,000 youth. See Table 5.
Alabama with 2.51; Montana with 2.37, and Maine with 2.34 had the highest recruitment rates out of all states. The national average was 1.59 recruits per 1,000 youth. The largest numbers of recruits were from Texas, California, Florida and New York. See Table 6.
The South had the highest recruitment rate followed by the Midwest. The Northeast had the lowest recruitment rate. See Table 2.
Other characteristics of recruits
Citizenship
Past NPP requests for DoD data on recruiting did not include citizenship. The data for fiscal year 2007 was the first time NPP requested the citizenship of recruits. Of all recruits, 3.1 percent were not U.S. citizens. Nearly 60 percent of non-citizen recruits came from California, Florida, New York and Texas, while only 32 percent of recruits overall came from these states.
Age
Up until 2006, an Army recruit could be anywhere between the age of 17 and 35. In January 2006, the DoD raised the age range up to 40 and then raised it again to 42 in June of the same year. Out of all recruits in fiscal year 2007, 1,596 or 2.4 percent, were 35-40 years of age and 71, or 0.11 percent were 41 or 42. In other words, fewer than 2.5 percent of all recruits were 35 or older by the end of fiscal year 2007. More than one in five recruits was 18, the most common age for recruits; 62% were 22 or younger; and 90% were 28 or younger by the end of the fiscal year.
Race and Ethnicity
The composition of recruits by race has not changed significantly since 2005. Data prior to 2005 are incompatible due to the change in categorization. Whites comprised 80.8 percent of active-duty Army recruits in fiscal year 2007; blacks made up 14.9 percent of recruits; Asians 3.2 percent; and American Indian/Alaskan Natives 1.0 percent. Recruits who were of Hispanic ethnicity declined from 11.8 percent in 2005 to 10.7 percent in 2007.
Serious consequences from recruiting woes
Recruiting difficulties have led to increased expenditures spent on recruiting. According to the federal government’s assessment rating of the Department of Defense recruiting program, “[T]he recruiting environment is more difficult, resulting in increased costs for bonuses and other incentives…Additional recruiters and funds were applied to the program in FY 2006 and FY 2007.”4 More than $4 billion is spent annually on recruiting.
Prior to 2005, only non-prior service ‘high quality’ recruits in selected occupations were eligible for bonuses. Subsequently, higher incentives to a much wider audience were implemented. In 2005, the Army instituted the “HiGrad” program which awarded cash bonuses to recruits with college credits, regardless of occupation. In 2006, the maximum amount for an enlistment bonus increased from $20,000 to $40,000 in order to address the shortfall in recruiting experienced in 2005. The Army College Fund payout and the maximum benefit from the Student Loan Repayment Program also increased to $70,000 and $65,000, respectively. In 2007, the Army introduced enlistment bonuses for shorter enlistment periods. In August of that year, the Army announced a $20,000 “quick-ship” bonus for recruits willing to report to basic training within 30 days of enlistment. The "Future Soldier Training Program," also introduced in 2007 and designed for high school seniors, pays recruits now to serve later. The Army pays high school students $1,000 per month between the commitment contract and leaving for basic training. Recruits in this program receive an additional $1,000 for graduating high school. Students may participate for up to one year, receiving up to $13,000 in the program.
In January 2005, the Army instituted an enlistment bonus of up to $10,000 for prior service recruits. The results of that incentive paid off for the Army. In 2006, more than 12,000 recruits, or nearly 15 percent, were prior service recruits. In 2007, the number climbed to more than 13,000, or 16.2 percent of all 2007 recruits. In 2005, fewer than 6,300, or 8.6 percent, of all recruits were prior service. The shortfalls in new recruits have been made up with prior service recruits.
Re-enlistment bonuses have also increased significantly. In 2006, these incentives increased from a maximum of $60,000 to $90,000. Total spending on re-enlistment bonuses increased from $505.6 million in FY2005 to $736.9 million in FY2006. In 2004, it was only $142.9 million and in 2003, $102.6 million, according to the Department of Defense Army budget documents.
1See Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, Population Representation 2004, Chapter 2-16. See also Department of Education, Educational and Labor Market Performance of GED Recipients, ‘The GED and the U.S. Armed Forces,’ February, 1998.
2See Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, Population Representation 2005, Executive Summary.
3Both of these correlations were statisticallly significant at the .02 level or better.
4Office of Management and Budget, ‘Program Assessment Rating Tool, Department of Defense Recruiting Program,’ last updated, August 13, 2007.
